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Abstract:

Since the landmark decision of Gideon vs Wainwright in the Supreme Court in
1963, free legal counsel for indigent clients has been required for every state in the
United States. However, the reality looks very different than this ideal with indigent
defense services across the country being under-resourced, under-funded and forgotten
by many other than those that require their services. This is happening in conjunction
with the explosion of incarceration rates throughout the United States. This study aims to
explain the relationship between the levels of funding provided for indigent defense
services and the rates of incarceration. Using a multi-variate regression my study tests
the per-capita funding for indigent defense services compared to the incarceration rates
for 49 states and every county in Pennsylvania. This study found for half of the results
that a higher level of funding for indigent defense services does lead to a lower
incarceration rate.

Colby

3

Acknowledgements:

This Independent Study (I.S.) would not have been possible without all of the
amazing support from all of my family and friends at and outside of the College of
Wooster. I would first like to thank my advisor, Dr. Sid Simpson for all of his assistance
and guidance throughout this process. I would not have been able to produce this product
without his help. Next, I would like to thank Dr. Angie Bos for all of her assistance with
the statistics in this project and patience with me for when the numbers did not make
sense. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family. To my family, I know
without a doubt I would not be in the place that I am without them and am eternally
grateful for all of their support. Thank you to all of you for listening to me obsessively
talk about the inequities in our justice system. To the #1 Squad, thank you all for your
undying sense of fun and the joy all of you bring to any situation. To the women of Zeta
Phi Gamma, I want to thank you all for unwavering support and love and for helping me
to find my strongest voice. And to all my other friends, you are all wonderful and there is
nothing I could do without you.

Colby

4

Table of Contents:
Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………...…. 2
Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………….. 3
List of Tables and Figures …………………………………………………………….. 5
Chapter 1: Introduction ………………………………………………………………. 6
Chapter 2: Literature Review ………………………………………….…………….. 10
I.

II.

III.
IV.

Funding for indigent defense services …………………………………………. 10
a. Where states stand currently …………………………………………………….. 12
b. Where does funding go when funded well ……………………………………… 17
c. The political reality of indigent defense funding ……………………………... 26
Mass incarceration rates ……………………………………………………….. 27
a. History of mass incarceration …………………………………………………… 27
b. Current state of mass incarceration …………………………………………….. 29
Indigent defense funding and mass incarceration ……………………………... 30
Gaps in the literature 32

Chapter 3: Methods …………………………………………………………………... 34
I.
II.
III.

IV.
V.
VI.

Hypotheses …………………………………………………………………….. 34
Case selection ………………………………………………………………….. 35
Independent and dependent variables ………………………………………….. 37
a. Levels of funding for indigent defense ………………………………………….. 37
b. Incarceration rates ………………………………………………………………… 38
Control variables ……………………………………………………………….. 40
Testing methodology ……………………………………………………………42
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………42

Chapter 4: Results and Discussion ………………………………………………….. 43
I.
II.

Hypotheses ………………………………………………………………………43
Results ………………………………………………………………………….. 44
a. 49 state data …………………………………………………………………………44
b. Pennsylvania data …………………………………………………………………..46

Chapter 5: Conclusion ……………………………………………………………..…. 49
I.
II.

Limitations ………………………………………………………………………50
Suggestions for future research ………………………………………………….51

References ……………………………………………………………………………... 53

Colby

5

List of Figures:
Figure 1: Funding for Prosecution vs. Indigent Defense Services ………………………..21
Figure 2: Indigent Defense Services Offices with Investigators …………………………...24
Figure 3: Incarceration rates since 1925 …………………………………………………….29
Figure 4: Annual incomes of incarcerated and non- incarcerated men ………………….31
Figure 5: Hypothesis arrow diagram …………………………………………………………35
Figure 6: Racial and age breakdown of Pennsylvania vs The United States …………….37
Figure 7: Arrow diagram of hypotheses ………………………………………………………44
Figure 8: State Indigent defense funding and incarceration (no controls) ………………44
Figure 9: 49 State indigent defense funding and incarceration with controls …………..45
Figure 10: Pennsylvania indigent defense funding and incarceration without controls 46
Figure 11: Pennsylvania indigent defense funding and incarceration with controls ….47
Each figure will also be listed in the appendices

Colby

6

Chapter 1: Introduction

“You have the right to an attorney, if you cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed to you.” – Miranda rights (also every television show ever)

These words are etched into the mind of almost every television watching
American citizen. We hear them so often that it becomes easy to internalize these words
as true and walk through life assuming that this right to legal counsel is ensured equally
to all criminal defendants. However, the reality of funding and access to free and
effective legal counsel can be very different. In a report on indigent defense services,
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver rewrote this section of the Miranda Rights to say
“You have the right to an attorney, if you cannot afford an attorney one will be
provided for you … that attorney may have 300 other cases that he or she is
working on, that’s not a joke, literally 300 other cases. They could potentially
have a total of seven minutes to prepare your defense … That attorney may be
exhausted not able to think straight, that attorney is likely to be grossly underpaid
or working in an office crawling with cockroaches … that attorney may pressure
you to take a guilty plea. Statistically … there’s a 90 plus percent chance that you
will take that guilty plea … and one other thing, that attorney that was provided
for you may not be free. If you lose you may have to pay ‘em, you might even
have to pay the prosecutor.”

1

Oliver’s reporting represents the reality of indigent defense in our criminal justice
system and serves as a call to examine what we see as true in this system with regards to
the availability of adequate legal services for indigent clients and the long-term impact it

1

Oliver, Public Defenders.
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has on communities in terms of the future of crime and incarceration. The goal from the
1963 Supreme Court in the case of Gideon vs Wainwright in mandating the availability of
legal counsel was to ensure that every client no matter their financial situation has the
ability to mount an effective defense against the prosecutors that charge them. Indigent
defense services are the (supposedly) free legal services provided to criminal defendants
who are unable to afford private legal counsel.
There are countless stories of indigent defense attorneys not being able to meet
the demands and expectations of their clients and caseloads. One of the best examples of
this is the story of Crystal Weimer, a mother to three girls, who was accused of a crime
she did not commit in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. 2 Weimer could not afford the
50,000 dollars it would cost to mount her defense and therefore turned to what she saw as
the best option for her, the Fayette County Office of the Public Defender. 3 Weimer,
knowing that she was innocent, originally stated that she was not concerned about the
outcome of her case but quickly realized that the patchwork system of indigent defense in
Pennsylvania would let her down. 4 After she was arrested for a second time after having
the charges dropped the first, she faced 30 years in prison for third-degree murder. 5 The
prosecution in her case offered her a plea deal which a representative from the public
defender’s office pushed her to accept. 6 She refused to do so however, stating that she
would not admit to doing something she hadn’t done. 7 This refusal to accept a plea

Preveti and Lazarski, “Wrongful Murder Conviction Points to Systemic Problems with Public Defense in
Pennsylvania.”
3
Preveti and Lazarski.
4
Preveti and Lazarski.
5
Preveti and Lazarski.
6
Preveti and Lazarski.
7
Preveti and Lazarski.
2
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pushed Weimer to take her case to trial, and leaving her fate in the hands of a public
defender who on average had two fewer months than their private counsel counterparts to
prepare for similar cases. 8
Weimer then spent two years in jail awaiting trial. 9 Despite all of this she
continued to be hopeful about the outcome of her case, believing that because she was
innocent, the jury would rule so. 10 Weimer was sentenced to 12-25 years in prison for
this crime that she did not commit. 11 Her attorney was not surprised at this outcome
stating, “I’m not going to beat myself up for this. I’ve been beating myself up for 33
years on this, it’s not going to change until the state takes over the system — which I
don’t see them ever doing – it’s not going to be a fair fight.” 12 This dejection is
something that indigent defense attorneys across the country feel, that no matter the hours
and effort they put in, they are so unevenly matched that, in many cases, it is difficult to
see a world in which an indigent defendant is actually heard in criminal cases. 13
Upwards of 80% of criminal defendants in the United States could be considered
indigent. 14 This statistic points to many of the problems that we see in the United States
Criminal justice system. Such a dramatic number of people needing these services
should imply that we would fund and pay more attention and respect to the people that
take on this work. However, these services are often the first on budget chopping blocks
and the last thing we consider when talking about criminal justice reform and prison

8

Preveti and Lazarski.
Preveti and Lazarski.
10
Preveti and Lazarski.
11
Preveti and Lazarski.
12
Preveti and Lazarski.
13
Pfaff, Personal conversation.
14
Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform.
9

Colby

9

abolition. Considering the fact that the United States has the largest prison population in
the world, and these services are in such high demand for those accused of crimes, it
ought to be impossible to attempt to reduce our incarcerated population without also
talking about indigent defense services. 15
This study aims to examine the relationship between the levels of funding for
indigent defense services and the levels of incarceration in those communities that they
represent. I hypothesize that the higher the funding for indigent defense services, the
lower the rate of incarceration. I base this hypothesis on the idea that higher funding for
indigent defense leads to these services having more access to more attorneys,
investigators, and social workers. This allows for indigent legal representation to be
better opponent to prosecutors which could cause lower incarceration rates as it creates
shorter sentences as well as fewer wrongful convictions.
In order to test this hypothesis I ran a multivariate regression testing the
relationship between the per capita funding for indigent defense services and the
incarcerated population from cases across the country. This study will be divided into
five chapters, the first being this introduction. In Chapter two I will analyze and
summarize the relevant literature surrounding indigent defense services and incarceration.
Chapter three is an overview of my methodology and variables used. In Chapter four, I
outline my results and discuss the implications. Finally, Chapter five summarizes
conclusions from this study and makes suggestions for future research.

15

Pfaff.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter will address the state of the current literature regarding the question
of how the level of funding for indigent defense services affects the rates of incarceration
in those same communities. I will begin with an overview of the literature on indigent
defense services and the current state of those services as they exist in real time. I will
then move to the state of the literature on mass incarceration. I will end with a discussion
of the brief literature on the two variables together and the gaps that exist in the literature
as a whole.

Funding for Indigent Defense Services
The right of the criminally accused to a defense attorney in a criminal proceeding
is and has been ensured since the sixth amendment was added to the constitution. 16
However, this right did not extend to court appointed lawyers for the poor in every
criminal case until the landmark supreme court case of Gideon vs Wainwright in 1963. 17
Before Gideon the only case considering criminal defense for indigent clients was Powell
vs Alabama in 1932. 18 Powell was a case in which nine Black men were accused of
raping two White women on a train. 19 These men, described as “young, ignorant, and
illiterate” could not afford an attorney for their defense and were sentenced to death in an
Alabama court. 20 At the time, Alabama law required appointed counsel for capital cases
but the attorneys in the case did not meet with their clients before the trial and for the

Justia, “The Right to a Public Defender Overview : Justia.”
Justia.
18
Sutherland, “Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).”
19
Sutherland.
20
Sutherland.
16
17

Colby 11
most part, merely appeared in court as opposed to mounting an effective defense. 21 The
question in this case was to discern whether the legal representation was unconstitutional
with regards to the Due Process Clause, which ensures the fair trial for all citizens in the
Fourteenth Amendment. 22 The court ruled with the petitioner finding, that when a client
as was the case for the defendants is unable to mount their own defense it is the duty of
the government to provide an effective defense for those defendants. 23
This question was then left silent in the courts until Gideon was argued in 1963. 24
In this case, Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony
breaking and entering. 25 Upon arriving to court without an attorney Gideon requested
that the court provide one for him. 26 However, Florida law only provided attorneys to
defendants in capital cases and Gideon was found guilty and sentenced to five years in
prison. 27 Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition stating that the lack of an attorney
violated his constitutional right to an attorney. 28 The outcome of this case ruled that the
assistance of counsel is imperative in order for a defendant to have a fair trial which
resulted in the conclusion that, in all criminal proceedings if the defendant could not
afford an attorney they would be provided one by the government, becoming an
important section of the Miranda rights listed to all people when arrested. 29 Since
Gideon, all states have been required to ensure the availability of some kind of legal

21

Sutherland.
Sutherland.
23
Sutherland.
24
Black, “Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).”
25
Black.
26
Black.
27
Black.
28
Black.
29
Justia, “The Right to a Public Defender Overview :: Justia.”
22
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counsel for the poor. 30 However, with no central federal regulations or standards, the
system for providing these legal services varies dramatically across states and can often
fall short of what is necessary. 31

Where states stand currently
After the Supreme Court mandated that legal services be provided for indigent
clients, states were left to create their own systems leading to a patchwork system across
the United States that is often inadequate in representing clients. There are four delivery
systems (sometimes referred to as implementation systems) for indigent legal services
across the United States: staffed public defenders, contract attorneys, assigned counsel,
and mixed or county based systems. 32
Staffed public defenders are public employees whose job consists solely of
representing indigent clients. 33 Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming all use a staffed
public defender system. 34 A study commissioned by the National Institute of Justice
found that staffed public defense attorneys tended to have marginally lower conviction
rates than contracted or assigned attorneys for certain homicide cases. 35 The authors
hypothesize that because public defenders work with prosecutors much closer and much

30

Justia.
Justia.
32
BJS, “Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) - Indigent Defense Systems”; Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th
Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.”
33
Pfaff, Personal conversation.
34
Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.”
35
Anderson and Heaton, “Measuring the Effect of Defense Counsel on Homicide Case Outcomes.”
31
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more often than the attorneys from the other implementation systems they develop a
better relationship than private attorneys and are able to yield a more favorable outcome
due to their knowledge of prosecutorial styles. 36 The makeup of these offices can vary
dramatically based on the funding that is allocated to them. 37 For example, the Office of
the Public Defender in Rockville, Maryland hosted attorneys, social workers, assistants,
and immigration specialists. However, this funding is distributed very unevenly between
the counties. 38 The office in Rockville was able to afford all of the personnel listed
above, but smaller, more rural areas see a disturbing lack of funding and personnel which
forces them to adopt increasingly high caseloads and decreased services to their clients. 39
Contract attorneys are private attorneys who work with states or county
governments on a contractual basis to represent a certain number of indigent clients. 40
Additionally, these attorneys generally carry a full caseload of private clients in addition
to their indigent ones. 41 The only state that uses a fully contract attorney system is
Oregon. 42 Studies on contract attorneys have yielded mixed results but the main
consensus is that the attorneys sustaining a full practice can lead to less favorable results
on trial outcomes (i.e. a higher conviction rate). 43 A study on indigent defense systems
found that “contract attorneys often maintain a private practice in addition to their
assigned clients, which can lead to excessive caseloads and may favor paying clients,
potentially resulting in less quality representation for those requiring public defense

36

Anderson and Heaton.
Owens et al., “Indigent Defense Services in the United States, FY 2008–2012 – Updated.”
38
Capital News Service, “Public Defenders Bear Uneven Burden.”
39
Capital News Service.
40
Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform.
41
Pfaff, Personal conversation.
42
Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.”
43
Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense.”
37
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services.” 44 This inability to ensure a parity in the quality of representation between
paying and indigent clients poses a large problem to contract attorney implementation
system.
Assigned counsel systems generally consist of private attorneys being appointed
by the court to represent indigent clients. 45 Assigned counsel differs from contract
attorney implementation systems in that instead of the state having contracts with
individual attorneys the state keeps a list of attorneys and the judge assigns attorneys
either in a systematic or ad hoc basis. 46 The ad hoc assignation system is one in which
the attorney is assigned almost arbitrarily and often assigned solely upon who is in the
courtroom during a defendants first appearance in court. 47 These attorneys are generally
paid hourly for their own work but must petition the court for more funds to pay for
investigators, expert witnesses, or any other costs relevant to building an effective
defense. 48 The other method of assigning counsel for indigent clients is the systematic or
coordinated assigned counsel program. 49 These generally involve some kind of
oversight body who sets standards that attorneys must meet in order to be admitted to the
program. 50 This system is the one preferred by the American Bar Association as it
creates a better system for guaranteeing quality of defense. 51 The states that use assigned
counsel programs are Alabama, Maine, and Massachusetts. 52 These attorneys face a
multitude of problems but the issue of a conflict of interest is particularly worrying;
44

Taylor.
US Legal, “Assigned Counsel Law and Legal Definition | USLegal, Inc.”
46
Spangenberg and Beeman, “Indigent Defense Systems in the United States.”
47
Spangenberg and Beeman.
48
Spangenberg and Beeman.
49
Spangenberg and Beeman.
50
Spangenberg and Beeman.
51
Spangenberg and Beeman.
52
Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.”
45
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“appointed counsel are impeded by conflicts of interest on the part of both the appointing
judges and the appointed counsel, limited compensation, incentives created by that
compensation, and relative isolation.” 53 This conflict of interest can be very detrimental
to the conviction rates for attorneys and the jail time and trial outcomes for indigent
clients.
Finally, mixed or county based systems use a mix of the above implementation
systems to provide services to the indigent. 54 Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho,
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and West Virginia all use mixed implementation models. 55 These mixed
implementation systems can vary from the majority of the state using one implementation
system with a few exceptions to initial trials using one implementation system while
appeals are handled by another. For example, Pennsylvania funds and implements their
indigent defense services on a completely county based method, meaning that each
county has a slightly different program. 56 In Pennsylvania, each county has a “Chief
Public Defender” and this is the only oversight that the counties indigent defense services
have. 57 In fact, some counties only employ that Chief Public Defender for every
indigent client in the county. 58 Philadelphia County, the largest county in Pennsylvania,

Anderson and Heaton, “Measuring the Effect of Defense Counsel on Homicide Case Outcomes.”
Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform.
55
Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.”
56
Owens et al., “Indigent Defense Services in the United States, FY 2008–2012 – Updated.”
57
Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.”
58
Gideon at 50.
53
54
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has a Chief Public Defender that oversees the long standing contract system with the
Defender Association of Philadelphia, a non-profit legal defense firm. 59
Where the funding for these different implementation systems creates another
opportunity for variation in indigent defense across the country. There are 24 states that
fund indigent defense completely from the state budget and state generated funds. 60
There does not seem to be a single unifying factor or trend between these states other
than their funding system for indigent defense that would predict this behavior or string
them together in a narrative that concerns indigent defense funding. The other popular
method for funding distribution for indigent defense is a mix of funding contributions
from local (usually county) and the state government. 61 The states that do this mixed
funding system can range from a state like Arizona receiving 99% of the indigent defense
funding from the county with and a 1% contribution from the state to something like the
Wisconsin system with almost the complete opposite with 93% of the indigent defense
funding coming from the state and 7% coming from the county. 62
Pennsylvania is the only state in the country that funds completely by the county
level. 63 This solely county funded system does pose many problems to the kind of legal
representation that comes from indigent defense systems. County budgets for the most
part are funded through property taxes, which, especially in a state like Pennsylvania with
such high demographic and economic variance, can result in a huge disparity in the level
of funding given to each state. 64 Counties with low property taxes and low demand for

59

Gideon at 50.
Gideon at 50.
61
Gideon at 50.
62
Gideon at 50.
63
Gideon at 50.
64
Meyer, “Despite Outlier Status, Pa. Lawmakers Don’t Make Public Defense a Priority.”
60
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indigent defense services can be as poorly staffed as counties with high property taxes
and high demand. 65 The funding match per capita for counties with lower property taxes
can at times be in even more need for funding in indigent defense cases, “a rural county,
with fewer resources, may be financially crippled by the need to fund the defense of a
single homicide case.” 66 This inability to represent an indigent client in a single
homicide case is in blatant violation of the ruling of Gideon but there is not a reform in
sight of Pennsylvania politics to address this problem. There has not been much attention
to this fact in any Pennsylvania news media however. In research for this project, there
were only three relatively high profile pieces on the issue. One entitled “Despite outlier
status PA lawmakers don’t make public defense a priority” outlines exactly the level of
apathy from the Pennsylvania legislature towards fixing the problem despite having
commissioned a report that came back with scathing results in 2011. 67

Where does funding goes when defense is funded well
The most glaring answer to where additional funding would go would be to pay
the salaries of additional attorneys to handle increasingly oppressive caseloads.
However, there are a multitude of other necessities for these offices to create an effective
defense for clients. 68 In a study of indigent defense throughout the United States

Lefstein and Spangenberg, “Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right
to Counsel.”
66
Lefstein and Spangenberg.
67
Meyer, “Despite Outlier Status, Pa. Lawmakers Don’t Make Public Defense a Priority.”
68
Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense”; Lee, Ostrom, and Kleiman,
“The Measure of Good Lawyering: Evaluating Holistic Defense in Practice”; Frederique, Joseph, and Hild,
“What Is the State of Empirical Research on Indigent Defense Nationwide? A Brief Overview and
Suggestions for Future Reseach”; Lefstein and Spangenberg, “Justice Denied: America’s Continuing
Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel.”
65
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researchers compiled a description of what sufficient funding for indigent defense
services would accomplish or look like. 69
“Resources, in the broadest sense, can include funding, time, training,
investigative services, independence and oversight. All of these are intertwined
and not easily disentangled. For example, a well-funded public defense system is
likely to be able to hire more public defenders, which in turn, will reduce
caseloads and give defenders more time on each case. At the same time, an
adequately funded agency with independence and oversight has control over how
those resources are used. A lack of independence and other structural problems
further contribute to struggling public defense systems.” 70
A study of legal offices in general show how the most effective defense does not look
only at the immediate situations of clients but looks at the case as a holistic process to
address all factors of the defendants life, aptly namely holistic defense. 71 Though holistic
defense is a relatively new term and has not been studied extensively, elements of it that
make for more effective indigent defense have been represented in the literature.
The first is the fact that higher funded indigent defense systems tend to have
lower caseloads per attorney which can lead to an overall better level of defense. 72 The
American Bar Association created a publication with the standards that should be upheld
in order for indigent defense to be considered effective;
1. The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of
defense counsel, is independent.
2. Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public defense delivery system
consists of both a defender office and the active participation of the private bar.

Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense.”
Taylor.
71
Lee, Ostrom, and Kleiman, “The Measure of Good Lawyering: Evaluating Holistic Defense in Practice.”
72
Frederique, Joseph, and Hild, “What Is the State of Empirical Research on Indigent Defense Nationwide?
A Brief Overview and Suggestions for Future Reseach.”
69
70
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3. Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is assigned and notified of
appointment, as soon as feasible after clients’ arrest, detention, or request for
counsel.
4. Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a confidential space within which
to meet with the client.
5. Defense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality
representation.
6. Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the complexity of the
case.
7. The same attorney continuously represents the client until completion of the case.
8. There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to
resources and defense counsel is included as an equal partner in the justice
system.
9. Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend continuing legal
education.
10. Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and
efficiency according to nationally and locally adopted standards. 73

These standards concern themselves mostly with ensuring that effective representation is
guaranteed by the attorneys having enough time and resources to adequately represent
their clients. 74 This is particularly relevant when considering the caseloads of indigent
defense attorneys. As a supplement to these standards the American Bar Association
released caseload standards of what would be the maximum amount of cases an attorney
could work on and still provide their clients with an effective defense. 75 The A.B.A.

American Bar Association, “Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System.”
American Bar Association.
75
Sixth Amendment Center, “Sufficient Time to Ensure Quality Representation - ABA Principle 4 | Sixth
Amendment Center.”
73
74
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cited a report titled Justice Denied: America’s Continued Neglect of Our Constitutional
Right to Counsel summation of the problem with excessive caseloads;
“As a consequence [of excessive caseloads], defense lawyers are constantly forced to
violate their oaths as attorneys because their caseloads make it impossible for them to
practice law as they are required to do according to the profession’s rules. They
cannot interview their clients properly, effectively seek their pretrial release, file
appropriate motions, conduct necessary fact investigations, negotiate responsibly with
the prosecutor, adequately prepare for hearings, and perform countless other tasks
that normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with sufficient time and resources.
Yes, the clients have lawyers, but lawyers with crushing caseloads who, through no
fault of their own, provide second-rate legal services, simply because it is not
humanly possible for them to do otherwise.”76
Studies of indigent defense systems across the country showed that 73% of the county
based public defense systems lacked enough attorneys to meet these standards. 77 For
state wide offices, 15/19 or 79% of the reporting offices exceeded these recommended
caseload limits and as a whole indigent defense offices had a median of 67% of the
attorneys necessary to meet these guidelines. 78 One study of these excessive caseloads
concluded that “As a consequence [of excessive caseload] even the best-intentioned
lawyers cannot render competent and effective defense services to all of their clients.” 79
The high caseloads, excessive hours and low pay in many cases lead to an extremely high
burnout rate for attorneys with high turnover and lower training for the attorneys that are
representing clients. 80 Additionally, indigent defense services are almost always

Lefstein and Spangenberg, “Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right
to Counsel.”
77
Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense.”
78
Taylor.
79
Lefstein and Spangenberg, “Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right
to Counsel.”
80
Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense.”
76
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disproportionately underfunded compared to their prosecutorial counterparts, very often,
with prosecutorial offices receiving twice as much funding as their indigent defense
counterpart. 81
Figure 1: Funding for Prosecution vs. Indigent Defense Services

82

In 2008, local and state governments spent over 200 billion dollars spent on
criminal justice activities broadly only 4.5 billion dollars was allocated for indigent
defense services. 83 This statistic shows the fact that even in poorer states, there is an
excessive amount of funding spent on criminal justice activities and that indigent defense
services are simply being left behind in the discussions in comparison to the
prosecutorial, police, and correctional counterparts. For example, in Mississippi in 2012,
the poorest state in the country, the state government spent almost 340 million dollars on
corrections and only 4,307,000 dollars on its indigent defense services. 84

81

Taylor.
Taylor.
83
Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform.
84
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This disparity in funding means that prosecutors can charge and follow through
with vastly more cases than the indigent defense services can keep up with leading these
attorneys to seek out and resort to plea deals to settle the vast majority of their cases. 85 A
study of indigent defense services found that 95% of cases handled by these services end
up closing the case with a plea deal. 86 Plea deals have seen a dramatic rise in the United
States in recent years a trend explained by the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers as;
“Guilty pleas have replaced trials for a very simple reason: individuals who
choose to exercise their Sixth Amendment right to trial face exponentially higher
sentences if they invoke the right to trial and lose…This [trial] penalty is now so
severe and pervasive that it has virtually eliminated the constitutional right to a
trial. To avoid the penalty, accused persons must surrender many other
fundamental rights which are essential to a fair justice system.” 87
These plea deals take less time for the defense attorneys and generally result in less
prison time for defendants and are much easier for prosecutors so many parties do push
for them. 88 The problem then becomes that defendants (regardless of if they have
actually committed a crime or not) have a criminal record, which often leads to a cycle of
criminality. 89 In California for instance, a guilty plea can become one of three strikes
which can prevent future employment often pushing people to be further entangled with
the criminal justice system. 90 The more time per case for prosecution offices also allows
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them to decide which cases they wish to push towards trial, which they wish to leverage
plea deals more aggressively with and which cases they wish to drop the charges for
completely. 91 Indigent defense offices do not have this luxury, they must defend all
cases that prosecutors have brought charges for and because of the overwhelming
caseloads often do not have to luxury of time to look into what cases have a viable trial
defense and which must resort to a plea deal. 92 One narrative study of a county in
Georgia saw only one public defender for the entire county who sustained a private
practice as well. 93 The author saw this attorney plead out 48 cases in a row for this
relatively small county of only about 20,000 people. 94 This pressure to take a plea deal
for clients can lead to people agreeing to staggering fines, jail time, and a permanent
record that could be avoided with lower caseloads for indigent defense attorneys. 95
This disparity between prosecutorial offices and indigent defense services extends
beyond the pure funding. The most pressing example is the presence (or in many more
cases lack thereof) of investigators. 96 Prosecutorial offices do not have to hire or retain
investigators to build a case to present at trial. 97 These resources come built into the
justice system as the police officers, sheriffs, and other law enforcement services work
closely with prosecutors.

98

Indigent defense services in order to build a case however,

must hire and retain their own investigators. 99 In fact, 87% of small public defense
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offices do not have a full-time investigator on staff.

100

This inability to find evidence to

build a case again leads to the high propensity for recommending plea deals to clients as
well as a further disparity between prosecutors and indigent defense services. 101
I worked as an intern at the Office of the Public Defender in Rockville, Maryland
and I was hired as an investigative intern for the office. My cohort and I were sent, with
very little training, to collect witness statements, issue subpoenas, and check alibis to help
the attorneys build cases but the office did not retain a full-time investigator and instead
relied on undergraduate interns. While police officers have to be admitted to and graduate
from the police academy for their training as investigators my cohort and I were only
given a week of very basic investigator training to serve the same function on the defense
side.
Figure 2: Indigent Defense Services Offices with Investigators
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Beyond investigators, indigent defense services may even lack the resources to
communicate effectively with their clients. All offices are required to provide in court
interpreters for indigent clients, but this does not always extend to the conversations that
are necessary to be had outside of court itself. 103 While working at the Office of the
Public Defender, I also worked as a Spanish language interpreter for the attorneys and
their clients. In Montgomery County, 41.5% of the population speaks a language other
than English and the office does not retain a full-time translator for any language. 104
Again, this responsibility was left to myself and some of the other undergraduate interns
and law clerks, most of whom did not have formal translation training.
Finally, the availability of other support personnel has been shown to be
extremely necessary to be able to provide effective criminal defense for indigent defense
services. 105 The introduction of a social worker in the defense process has been shown
to greatly reduce the likelihood of recidivism and excessive prison time for clients of
indigent defense services. 106 Social workers lower this risk as they direct clients of
indigent defense services to mental health and substance abuse programs instead of only
incarceration which can assist in addressing the problems at the root of crimes committed
as opposed to simply wielding a retributive stick at people convicted of crimes. 107 This
referral to mental health and substance abuse programs has been shown to save
government spending down the line, “Kentucky implemented such a program [social
worker program] and found that social workers saved the state 3.25 dollars in criminal
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justice costs for every 1 dollar in social worker salaries. Social service workers in Rhode
Island saved the state 15 million dollars.” 108 This statistic shows the staggering amount
of money that could be saved by state governments by simply providing funding for
support personnel in indigent defense offices.

The Political Reality of Indigent Defense Funding
While there have been many issues found in the literature surrounding indigent
defense services, the findings of these studies have not been shown to change the political
popularity of funding for these services. Though all people could most likely recite the
Miranda rights given to people arrested in the United States including the right to an
attorney, not all support increasing funding indigent defense services. A 2000 study
found that only two-thirds of respondents said that attorneys should be provided for the
poor, a statistic in direct odds with the supreme court mandate for free legal services for
indigent clients. 109 Furthermore, only 17% of the respondents believed that funding
should be increased for indigent defense services and this number rose to only 33% after
some discussion of the issue. 110 This discussion of the issue of funding indigent defense
services involved informing respondents of the current state of indigent defense including
the number of criminal defendants who cannot afford private legal representation and
dramatic underfunding of the offices attempting to meet this demand. 111 Another study
found that the level of funding for welfare programs was not a predictor of funding and
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support for Indigent defense offices. 112 This is surprising considering that funding for
welfare programs could be comparable to the support for funding for indigent defense
services. 113 Additionally, support for the politics of the “punitive turn” (the trend
towards mass incarceration and harsher punishments in the criminal justice system)
predict less support for indigent defense. 114 This inability to find political factors that
predict support for funding for indigent defense creates a problem for studying the
motivations for state legislatures to recommend increases or decreases in funding for
indigent defense services.

Mass Incarceration Rates
Unlike indigent defense services, mass incarceration does have a large backing of
academic studies and is likewise much more discussed in popular media and civil rights
movements. It is however very related to the study of indigent defense. Many studies of
prison populations have found that roughly 75 percent of people incarcerated were
indigent when they stood trial. 115 This dramatic number shows how any discussion of
reducing the incarcerated population must inherently involve a discussion of the funding
provided for and the quality of our indigent defense services.
History of Mass Incarceration
The general population of the United States accounts for less than five percent of
the world’s total, but more than twenty percent of the world’s total prison population is
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claimed by the United States. 116 This massive and unproportionate number has not,
however, always been the case. 117 Between 1940 and 1975 the prison population in the
United States hovered around 100 incarcerated people per 100,000 of the total
population. 118 With the introduction of policies of the Nixon Administration and other
administrations following the rate of incarcerated people exploded to an average of 500
people incarcerated per 100,000 by the 2000’s. 119 Policies like mandatory minimums,
broken windows policing, and the War on Drugs contributed to this explosion of
incarceration which overwhelmingly impacts low income people and people of color. In
the same polls of the incarcerated population, per 100,000 people the incarceration rate of
Black Americans is 2,207, of Latinx Americans is 966, and of White Americans the rate
is only 380. 120 For low income persons, in 2014, the median income of incarcerated
people was 19,185 dollars prior to their incarceration, 41% less than those who are not
incarcerated. 121 Despite their stated purpose of reducing crime however, these policies
have done little to impact the overall crime rates in the United States. 122 In fact, there
have been many studies that suggest the opposite. 123 Instead of reducing crime, the fact
of someone spending time in prison can be shown to increase the likelihood of recidivism
for that individual. 124
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Figure 3: Incarceration rates since 1925
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Current State of Mass Incarceration
Currently, the overcriminalization of petty offenses leads to higher arrest and
incarceration rates across the country. 126 The United States spends 79 billion dollars
annually on corrections which averages to 31,286 dollars spent annually per prisoner
within the criminal justice system. 127 Additionally, the private interests that control
much of the prison system have a vested interest in continuing the growth of the prison
population. 128 For profit prisons create a market for incarcerated people that creates a
culture of quota meeting in order to fill prison beds in order to generate more capital for
those that control the prisons. 129 Beyond the monetary incentives of for profit prisons,
the issue of prison gerrymandering presents another incentive for lawmakers to keep the
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prison populations high. 130 Prison gerrymandering is the process of lawmakers deciding
(despite the fact that incarcerated individuals in most places are disenfranchised) where
the population of prisons is counted for the drawing of district boundaries, a process
highly reminiscent of the three-fifths compromise. 131 The question for this issue is
whether incarcerated individuals should be counted as living at their most recent address
before they were incarcerated or if their address should be recorded as the prison they are
incarcerated in. 132 The motivation for the latter is that prisoners (most of whom are
people of color who tend to vote more liberal) would be removed from the cities that they
generally live in to rural areas creating many more districts in rural areas which would
otherwise not exist. 133 A study of Pennsylvania districts found that eight congressional
districts would not meet federal population requirements if they had not counted
incarcerated individuals in that district. 134

Indigent Defense Funding and Mass Incarceration
Currently, an average of 80% of people that are charged with a crime in the
United States are eligible for indigent defense services. 135 This number varies greatly
nationally however. For example, in Wisconsin, over 93% of people that are arrested are
eligible for a public defender. 136

130

Pfaff, Personal conversation.
Pfaff.
132
Pfaff.
133
Pfaff.
134
Wagner and Lavarreda, “Importing Constituents Pennsylvania.”
135
Pfaff, Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform.
136
Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense.”
131

Colby 31

Figure 4: Annual incomes of incarcerated and non- incarcerated men
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Despite this massive link between people requiring indigent defense services and the
representation of low income people in the prison population, there have not been any
empirical studies on the relationship between funding for indigent defense services and
mass incarceration.
There have, however, been pieces written by scholars of criminal justice
regarding this relationship. 138 One article found that “In 2008, for every dollar spent on
public defense, taxpayers spend nearly 14 on corrections.” 139 Scholars have found that
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the lack of quality defense can lead to longer pre-trial defense for those who cannot
afford the cash bail required to be removed from pretrial detention. 140 Additionally,
scholars have found that the lack of quality defense can lead to excessive prison
sentences for defendants. 141 The increase in guilty plea bargains that accompanied
increased charges and excessive caseloads for public defense have led to prosecutors
proposing slightly reduced sentences for guilty pleas but for the small proportion of cases
that do go to trial defendants, if found guilty, are given excessive prison sentences. 142
The articles surrounding these topics together propose higher funding for public defense
as a solution for mass incarceration but do not have an empirical backing to them. 143

Gaps in the Literature
The largest gap in the literature as it stands is the fact that there is no empirical
study on the link between the levels of funding for public defense and the rates of
incarceration for those communities. Across the board however, there is a surprisingly
low number of studies that concern indigent defense funding. There are no studies that
cover the degrees of efficacy of different indigent defense implementation systems. 144
There is also a dearth in literature regarding political culture surrounding indigent defense
funding and popular support for it. This lack of literature could be partially explained by
the relative novelty of mandated indigent defense services across the country. Though
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the ruling in Gideon came out in 1963, its full implementation across the country took
many years to come to fruition. Additionally, once it was a relatively fleshed out system,
the people in need of or impacted by these systems and services are generally those that
are thought of as undesirable in the United States i.e. low income people, people of color,
and those convicted of crimes. All people that academic writing often forgets about.
Finally for indigent defense services, it is necessary to study the reasons for these chronic
underfunding and the policies that must be put in place to improve the system as a whole.
With regards to mass incarceration, more research is needed on the political
atmosphere surrounding mass incarceration and how that plays into the future of certain
inmates and criminal defendants.
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Chapter 3: Methods
The previous chapter outlined the existing literature surrounding indigent defense
services, incarceration rates, and the small amount of literature on the relationship
between the two. However there persist a large gap in this literature. For the most part,
there is very little research on indigent defense services as a whole and the impact that
these services can have on the lives of the people and communities that they represent.
Because of this gap, this study attempts to answer the following question: what impact
does the level of funding for indigent defense services have on incarceration rates?
This chapter will address the methodology that will be used to test this question. I
will first list my hypotheses and arrow diagrams depicting this relationship. I will also
discuss the cases I will be looking at to test this hypothesis. I will then list and describe
major and control variables and the ways in which each of these variables will be
operationalized. Finally, I will describe the methodology and justification for this
method for testing the relationship between these variables.

Hypotheses
H1: Increased funding for indigent defense services lowers rates of incarceration in the
communities that these services represent.
Hnull: The level of funding for public defense will have no impact on incarceration rates of
the communities that these services represent.
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Figure 5: Hypothesis arrow diagram
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The level of funding for indigent defense services is my independent variable and
the incarceration rate is the dependent, with the other control variables being entered in as
a part of my test.

Case Selection
I will be looking at information from 49 states and all of the counties in
Pennsylvania. I will not be including Alaska in my study because their funding level is
almost double the next highest per capita funding for indigent defense services. In 2018,
the Alaska House Finance committee approved a measure to increase funding for their
public defense department by 1 million dollars in order to bring the caseloads of the
public defender’s office closer to the American Bar Association standards. 145 There is
not a discernable difference between Alaska and other states with much less funding
allocated to indigent defense, only the fact that members of the Alaska House Finance
Committee cited an ethical obligation to increasing funding for the Public Defender
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Agency. 146 Because Alaska is so different from the other states in this respect it could
negatively affect the statistical significance of the data from the other states and not show
the trend of the data nationally to an accurate degree.
I will be looking at the data from all of the counties in Pennsylvania for a few
reasons. First, as stated in the previous chapter, Pennsylvania is the only state that leaves
funding and implementation of the mandate from Gideon of providing indigent clients
legal services completely to each of the counties. There is no statewide oversight or
funding given to the county governments which is sharply different from every other
state in the country. Second, the demographic and urban makeup of Pennsylvania is very
representative of the rest of the United States as a whole. The racial and age breakdown
of Pennsylvania is very comparable to the United states a whole as shown by the chart
below. Additionally, using Pennsylvania as a case study will give information on many
different implementation systems within similar demographic groups, thus showing the
impact of funding across the board. Finally, focusing in on one state can create a more
reliable study as it controls for a generally similar attitude towards criminal justice within
one state, which is virtually impossible within the scope of this study when studying a
country of 330 million people.
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Figure 6: Racial and age breakdown of Pennsylvania vs The United States
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Additionally, Pennsylvania is home to two relatively large cities as well as a good
representation of rural and suburban areas. Finally, having a more granular view of
funding disparities between urban, suburban, and rural communities can improve upon
the legitimacy and external validity of this study.

Independent and Dependent Variables
Level of Funding for Indigent Defense Services
For this variable I will be looking at the per capita funding awarded to indigent
defense services for both groups. Indigent defense funding is defined as the
constitutionally mandated free legal services to those accused of crimes who cannot
afford it. 148 I will be looking at indigent defense funding across all of the

147
148

US census, “U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts.”
National Center for State Courts, “| National Center for State Courts.”

Colby 38

implementation methods (staffed public defenders, contract attorneys, assigned counsel,
and mixed or county based systems). 149 This allows for this study to not be biased
towards or against any state that has mixed implementation systems as it records the
funding across the board. Though there have been so few studies that deal with indigent
defense services this information was readily available thanks to the information
provided by the organization “Gideon at 50” and reports by WHYY the Philadelphia
NPR station. 150 Operationalization of this variable is simple as it is not necessary to
convert the variable to a testable number.

Incarceration Rates
For the 49 states, I will be looking at the incarceration rates published by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics from 2016. 151 This data recorded every person that was a
part of the incarcerated population in 2016 at every level (including jails). 152 In order to
operationalize this data I will look at the rate of incarcerated people per 100,000 people
that are not incarcerated. This will enable me to not have to control for the total
population of the state. Additionally, it is widely agreed in the literature that this is one
of the most effective way of measuring incarceration rates. 153 The other option for this
variable would be to look at the incarceration rate per crime committed. 154 Because of
the limited timeline and scope of this study as well as the wide variation of crime rates

BJS, “Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) - Indigent Defense Systems”; Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright.”
150
Gideon at 50, “Gideon at 50 - 50th Anniversary of Gideon vs. Wainwright”; Meyer, “Despite Outlier
Status, Pa. Lawmakers Don’t Make Public Defense a Priority.”
151
Kaeble and Cowhig, “Correctional Populations in the United States, 2016.”
152
Kaeble and Cowhig.
153
Taylor, “System Overload: The Costs of Under- Resourcing Public Defense.”
154
Pfaff, Personal conversation.
149

Colby 39

across the United States the incarceration rate per 100,000 people is the most applicable
measure for this study. 155
For the Pennsylvania counties, collecting data on incarceration rates gets more
complicated. Each of the counties does not publish how many people it incarcerates or it
sends to prisons from their justice systems. Therefore, I decided to calculate what each
county’s share of Pennsylvania’s total incarceration rate ought to be based on other
available statistics of their justice systems. In order to do this, I found the total number of
plea deals that came out of each county as this is the closest statistic to conviction rates
that was available. I then added all of these numbers together and determined the
percentage of the total that each county is responsible for. I then apportioned that same
percentage to the total incarceration rate of Pennsylvania and attributed the resulting
number to each county rounding to the nearest whole number for each county. There is
general agreeance in the literature that the rise in the number of plea deals (which is
widely attributed to the unequal funding and legal representation between prosecutors
and indigent defense services) has increased incarceration across the board as well so I
believe this to be a good surrogate for the incarceration numbers themselves. 156 With
these numbers for Pennsylvania, they will not be reported as the number of incarcerated
people per 100,000 not incarcerated as many of these countries do not meet this threshold
100,000 people as a baseline and cannot therefore be put in that comparison. Because of
this, I will control for the population of each county in Pennsylvania when running the
test.
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Control Variables
For the 49 states and granular view of Pennsylvania that I will be testing I will
look at various control variables in order to ensure the external validity of this study.
The first group is the racial demographic controls. All literature concerning the
United States criminal justice system acknowledges the fact that people of color are
disproportionately affected by the system compared to their white counterparts and it is
therefore necessary to control for these factors the racial groups. These groups that I
have identified are the racial groups that the census asks about including; White, Black,
American Indian or Alaskan native, Asian, Native Hawaiian, two or more races, and
Latinx. 157
I will also control for the economic factors that are so prevalent in their effect on
the system i.e. the poverty and per capita income of every state and county. Specifically,
for the Pennsylvania counties I will also control for the median household price as listed
on Zillow. 158 Much of where counties get their budget from is based on the property
taxes they collect. Because the property taxes in each of the counties can vary so much
based on the housing prices it is necessary to control for the housing prices as it can be an
indication of the property taxes that the county can collect. 159
Additionally, I will attempt to control for the level of punitiveness of the
prosecutorial and police systems. A less punitive prosecutorial force and the rise of
progressive prosecutors mainly in cities has reduced the incarceration rates of those
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communities as prosecutors lean towards less punitive sentences and sentence
recommendations for communities. 160 John Pfaff, one of the leading scholars concerning
criminal justice reform particularly with reference to indigent defense services,
emphasized the fact that prosecutors have an extreme amount of power in criminal trials
and this power must be controlled for in order to ensure the external validity of this
study.161 In order to control for this, I will record the percentage of the state and county
that voted for Donald Trump as president. This can be used as a surrogate for the
percentage of the state and county that would lean very conservative and the amount of
people that would support more harsh sentences for people who have been convicted of
crimes particularly when the sentences would impact people of color. 162
Additionally, I will look into if the state or county has any elected judges. Elected
judges tend to lean towards more harsh sentences as a reelection technique. 163 Finally,
for this measure I will be looking at the percentage of charges dropped in each state and
county as a measure of the willingness for prosecutors to be lenient on underserving
charges or sentences. For this variable I will look at whether or not there are any elected
judges present in the state as reported by Ballotpedia.164 For operationalization, I will
code the presence of elected judges as 0 and non-elected judges as 1. All of the judicial
positions in Pennsylvania are selected by partisan election so there is no need to control
for this variable.165
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Testing Methodology
I will be testing this question using a multivariate regression analysis in SPSS.
Because the relationship between these variables has never been tested empirically, I
wanted to be able to use a relatively simple test and method to be able to establish a
baseline for future testing. I will look for statistically significant results that move in a
negative direction as a sign of confirmation of my hypothesis and rejection of the null. I
will also be using a multivariate regression as the variables I will be using are continuous
as opposed to discrete or categorical.

Conclusion
This study will analyze the impact that levels of funding for indigent defense
services has on incarceration by running a multivariate regression and controlling for the
variables listed above. The control variables will attempt to serve as a control for the
punitive levels of different states and create a high level of external validity for this study.
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Chapter 4: Results and Discussion
The previous chapters outlined the current state of the literature regarding this
question and the methodology that I would use to test the question and hypothesis. This
chapter will go on to discuss the results of the multivariate regression. First I will restate
my hypothesis and arrow diagrams and how they relate to the information I was able to
collect. I will then display the results of the regressions I ran and the implications of
those results. Finally, I will then briefly discuss the limitations of those results.

Hypotheses
As I stated in the previous chapter because there have been no empirical tests
done on the question of this study (What affect does the level of funding for indigent
defense services have on incarceration rates?) this study seeks to establish a baseline
relationship between the two variables. Keeping that in mind, the hypotheses for this test
are:
H1: Increased funding for indigent defense services lowers rates of incarceration in the
communities that these services represent.
Hnull: The level of funding for indigent defense services will have no impact on
incarceration rates of the communities that these services represent.
This can further be illustrated by the arrow diagram below:
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Figure 7: Arrow diagram of hypotheses
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Results
I will divide the results by the two analyses I ran with one section on the 49 state
analysis and one on the Pennsylvania county analysis. Because these two tests needed to
have different control variables and different numbers for incarceration rate and levels of
funding for indigent defense the results must be viewed as having been run separately but
the implications of those results discussed together.

49 State Analysis
I began this study with a simple analysis of the basic relationship between the
level of funding for indigent defense services and incarceration rates.

Figure 8: 49 State Indigent defense funding and incarceration (no controls)
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This test preliminarily confirmed my hypothesis of the negative relationship
between indigent defense funding and incarceration rate but it did not include any of the
controls necessary to improve the external validity of the study. This does show that I
can expect to find a negative relationship between the main variables, preliminarily
confirming the relationship I expected to see in my hypothesis.
Next, I ran a test with the controls that I believed would be the most significant in
determining the relationship between the two variables. These include the Black
population, latinx population, and the percentage of the population that identifies as two
or more races. I also controlled for the poverty rate as well as if the state has any elected
judges or not.
Figure 9: 49 State indigent defense funding and incarceration with controls
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Though this test would prove more generalizable due to the presence of the
control variables, the results are not statistically significant. Despite the fact that they do
not meet this .05 threshold of statistical significance, they are still moving in a negative
direction giving an indication that my hypothesis for the state level analysis could still be
confirmed in some future study.

Pennsylvania County Data
For the analysis of the Pennsylvania data I followed similar steps to the 49 state
analysis. First I ran a simple test with only the first two variables while controlling for
the total population of each of the counties because the incarceration rate was not given
as the number of people incarcerated per 100,000 but instead solely the number of
incarcerated people total.

Figure 10: Pennsylvania indigent defense funding and incarceration without controls

This test was markedly more significant and successful than the 49 state analysis
with extremely significant results. This shows that I can expect if not completely
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significant results I can expect a confirmation of the negative relationship I expected in
my hypothesis. I next ran an analysis with the racial demographic control variables for
each of these counties. These include the Black population, Latinx population, and the
population that identifies as two or more races. I also included controls for the median
household price in order to control for the property taxes that each county can collect. In
order to control for the punitive levels of the prosecution and police force I added a
variable for the percentage of the cases dismissed by the prosecution. In conversations
with experts in studying indigent defense services agree that this can be an effective
surrogate measure for the punitive levels in counties. 166

Figure 11:Pennsylvania indigent defense funding and incarceration with controls

166

Pfaff, Personal conversation.
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This test led to an extremely high level of significance in the expected direction of
a negative relationship. From this we can understand that in Pennsylvania there is
enough data to reject the null hypothesis and the direction of the relationship is confirmed
for the other 49 states. We can assume that because of the higher number of cases as well
as a more consistent attitude towards criminal justice as it is only studying 12 million
people compared to the 330 million of the United States as a whole.
While these data represent a very preliminary dive into the answer to the question
of what effect levels of funding for indigent defense services has on incarceration rates it
does give an indication towards the impact that adequate funding for indigent legal
services can have on dampening the magnitude of the mass incarceration crisis in the
United States.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The aim of this study was to establish if there is a linear relationship between the
level of funding spent on indigent defense services and the rate of incarceration in those
communities. This study focused on two specific groups of communities, the state-wide
funding and the county level funding for Pennsylvania specifically. For the state-wide
funding I took the aggregate per capita funding provided to all indigent defense services
and compared that to the incarceration rate per 100,000 people in each state. For the
county level data for Pennsylvania I looked to the total funding provided for indigent
defense and the total number of people incarcerated and controlled for the total
population as there is such a disparity in population size and income levels across
Pennsylvania.
I hypothesized that the higher the level of funding for indigent defense, the lower
the rate of incarceration. I based this hypothesis on the idea that higher funding for
indigent defense leads to these services having more access to more attorneys,
investigators, and social workers which allows for public defenders to be better
opponents to prosecutors which could cause lower incarceration rates as it creates shorter
sentences as well as fewer wrongful convictions. My hypothesis was partially confirmed
and partially not. The data for Pennsylvania was statistically significant in the negative
direction confirming this hypothesis. For the other 49 states however, the results were
not statistically significant but did move in a negative direction confirming that there is
some measure of a negative relationship between the variables of levels of funding for
indigent defense and incarceration.
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Limitations
Due to limitations of time, there are a few drawbacks that could affect the
reliability of this study. First, there is not a great variety of literature on which to base
this study. Because there has not been a wide variety of studies on indigent defense as a
topic it was difficult to come up with variables with a high level of external validity as
they are mostly based on opinion pieces and interviews I have done.
Second, there is not a direct significant relationship in both groups of variables.
Though this can be used to indicate the direction of the relationship of the variables it
cannot definitively say that there is a relationship. Though Pennsylvania can indicate a
statistically significant relationship, because it is limited to one state we cannot say that
there is a universal claim to be made. The fact of statistical significance only for
Pennsylvania could potentially be explained by the fact that there can be assumed a
generally consistent view towards the criminal justice system. Though there may be a
great variation in political opinions across the state the attitudes towards prosecution and
policing is generally a more consistent attitude across communities and could lead to a
more reliable result in a way that would be difficult to control for. 167
Third, it is difficult to control for all of the factors that can affect incarceration
rates as well as funding for indigent defense services. As with many social science
questions it is difficult to make any sweeping claims and control for every factor. This is
especially true in fields such as criminal justice where the field is changing so much and
in many cases is very subject to the opinions of prosecutors and local government
officials.

167

Frey and Teixeira, “The Political Geography of Pennsylvania:”
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Suggestions for Future Research
In order to rectify the limitations of this study there are a few suggestions for
future research of this question.
First, it would be effective for a future study to utilize time series data to test the
same question. In this study, I would take the same variables used in this study and apply
a test over a series of years. This study would be able to account for the change of
funding for indigent defense services as well as changes in policies that can contribute to
higher arrest rates and incarceration.
Second, it would be beneficial to interview and observe individual offices across
the country. This would have a twofold benefit for assisting in the better understanding
of this research question. First, it would give the ability to learn about the individual
differences in every indigent defense office which can affect case outcomes. Second, this
individualized attention to certain communities would give the opportunity to better
control for the punitive culture of those communities. This study made preliminary steps
to control for the level of punitiveness coming from prosecutorial and police offices but
further studies would benefit greatly from having more focused and individualized
interview based data on this factor.
The Promise of Gideon
The promise of Gideon was simple, ensure a fair trial for every person accused of
a crime with the availability of free legal services to indigent clients. The reality has
become very different, with clients waiting years for trial, attorneys having seven minutes
to prepare a case, and thousands upon thousands of clients being forced into guilty pleas.
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There is one specific instance that shows this inequity in legal representation
between prosecution and indigent defense services being rectified. In 2018, the Alaskan
Public Defender went to the Alaskan House Finance Committee chairman and presented
evidence of the dramatic state of overwork in the Alaskan Public Defender’s office. 168
He stated, “There’s a principal of ethics that requires a lawyer not to accept a case if they
can’t competently handle that case, and not having enough time would be that reason so,
we would attempt to refuse cases.” 169 The Alaskan House Finance Committee after
hearing this evidence and reading the caseload standards from the American Bar
Association allocated one million extra dollars for new attorneys in order to meet the
national standards and making Alaska such an outlier for per capita indigent defense
spending. 170
Alaska is not a state that is usually seen as a leader in criminal justice reform but
they made a crucial, logical, choice to fund their indigent defense services adequately in
order to meet the recommended caseload standards. Though this happened too recently
to know what the impact of this extra funding will have on the incarceration rate, the
findings in this study indicate that in coming years, the incarceration rate will decrease
and Alaska will be on the way to fulfilling the promise set forth by Gideon.

Kitchenman, “Lawmakers Add Funding for Public Defenders.”
Kitchenman, Media, and Juneau, “Lawmakers Add Funding for Public Defenders.”
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Appendix:
Figure 1: Funding for Prosecution vs. Indigent Defense Services

Figure 2: Indigent Defense Services Offices with Investigators
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Figure 3: Incarceration rates since 1925

Figure 4: Annual incomes of incarcerated and non- incarcerated men

Figure 5: Hypothesis arrow diagram

Level of funding for
indigent defense
services

IV

Incarceration rate

D
V

Colby 59

Figure 6: Racial and age breakdown of Pennsylvania vs The United States

Figure 7: Arrow diagram of hypotheses
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Figure 8: 49 State Indigent defense funding and incarceration (no controls)

Figure 9: 49 State indigent defense funding and incarceration with controls
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Figure 10: Pennsylvania indigent defense funding and incarceration without controls

Figure 11:Pennsylvania indigent defense funding and incarceration with controls

